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Abstract: The current financial crisis offers a unique opportunity to investigate the
leading properties of market indicators in a stressed environment and their usefulness
from a banking supervision perspective. One pool of relevant information that has been
little explored in the empirical literature is the market for bank’s exchange-traded option
contracts. In this paper, we first extract implied volatility indicators from the prices of
the most actively traded option contracts on financial firms’ equity. We then examine
empirically their ability to predict financial distress by applying survival analysis tech-
niques to a sample of large US financial firms. We find that market indicators extracted
from option prices significantly explain the survival time of troubled financial firms and
do a better job in predicting financial distress than other time-varying covariates typically
included2 in2 bank2 failure2 mo2dels.2 Overall,2 b2oth2 accounting2 information2 and2 option2 prices
contain useful information of subsequent financial problems and, more importantly, the
combination produces good forecasts in a high-stress financial world, full of doubts and
uncertainties.
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Executive summary
BothA theoreticalA andA empiricalA literatureA convincinglyA argueA thatA privateA marketA participants
(shareholders, debtholders, large counterparts in derivative markets. . . ) are able to fairly identify
risky institutions when the financial system is in good shape. This result is based on the quality
of the Hayekian information disseminating process accompanying the price formation alchemy.
At the same time, there is a broad consensus that market signals often become erratic and
extremely volatile during times of stress, when investors face severe aggregate shocks and markets
may stop functioning because systemic risk is at stake. The global financial crisis that broke
out in the Summer 2007 provides a unique opportunity to test directly the validity of such a
broad consensus and to investigate the leading properties of market signals in a highly stressed
environment, characterized by a significant number of real-life failure episodes in the financial
services industry.
In this paper, we pursue this new direction in the empirical literature and focus on a potential
source of information that has been overlooked so far in this research area: the market for
exchange-traded option contracts on financial firms’ equity. Swidler and Wilcox (2002) are the
first to suggest adding time-varying measures of implied volatility (IV) extracted from option
prices to the menu of market-based risk indicators that regulators and supervisors should regularly
monitor. They based their policy recommendation on the idea that IVs have lower root-mean-
squared-error forecasts of banks’ future share price volatility than historical volatilities do and
hence improve forecasts based solely on historical volatilities. They also show that IVs are only
imperfectly correlated with other market signals, such as bank share prices and sub-debt yield
spreads, which is an encouraging result.
In the present paper, we take a more straightforward approach to gauge the usefulness of
option market indicators for micro-prudential purposes. Particularly, instead of assessing the
ability of IV to forecast actual, future volatilities of share prices, we use option market indicators
to improve the accuracy of survival models typically conceived to predict material deteriorations
in financial firms’ conditions. Moreover, in contrast to previous literature, which relies extensively
on broad definitions of default such as rating downgrades, we use a narrower definition of financial
distress by focusing on major corporate events — such as dividend cuts and omissions — that are
systematically followed by failures, insolvencies, bankruptcies, management turnovers or massive
restructuring activities.
To put into perspective the above-mentioned contributions to the literature, we conduct a
comprehensive statistical analysis to assess the ability of early-warning indicators derived from
option prices to predict occurrences of distress in the financial services industry. For that purpose,
we apply alternative empirical specifications to a sample of large US financial firms (75 banks and
180 financial services firms) based on survival analysis: non-parametric tests; semi-parametric
(Cox proportional hazards) regressions; and parametric (accelerated failure time) models. Our
results indicate that market indicators extracted from option prices significantly explain time-to-
failure of distressed financial firms and do a better job in predicting financial distress than other
time-varying covariates typically included in bank failure models (profitability ratios; financial
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leverage; operating efficiency; fraction of doubtful assets; composite scores based on financial
ratios). Overall, both accounting information and option prices contain useful information of
subsequent financial problems and, more importantly, the combination produce better forecasts
in a high-stress financial world, full of doubts and uncertainties.
The results are relevant to the current debate around the proposals requiring systemically
important financial institutions to issue contingent capital notes, i.e. debt certificates or subordi-
nated bonds that would automatically convert to common equity when a predefined idiosyncratic
trigger is reached during a systemic crisis. Most of the proponents of contingent capital advocate
for a market-based conversion trigger (e.g. equity prices, CDS spreads) on the grounds that the
accounting measures are inherently backward-looking and fail to reflect in a timely manner the
true financial conditions of a large and complex banking organization. Yet, the empirical liter-
ature remains silent on the ability of market-based indicators to flag financial problems during
episodes of extreme stress in the financial system. The present study fills this important gap in
the literature and suggests adding market indicators extracted from option prices to the menu
of vulnerability metrics that regulators should intensively monitor, especially during a large-scale
financial turmoil.
1. Introduction and motivation
The intervention of public authorities in modern banking and financial systems is a
ubiquitous phenomenon. In most countries, financial firms are viewed as “special” entities
and receive a highly-specific treatment from governments, whatever their political color.
In contrast to industrial companies, whose governance is commonly assured by the free-
market forces, financial firms are governed by a mix of private and public arrangements.
During their normal activity, financial institutions (FIs) face two kinds of constraints: some
are imposed by private market participants (market discipline), others are designed and
enforced by public authorities (regulatory discipline). In times of financial crisis, more weight
is assigned to regulatory discipline on the grounds that the market discipline mechanism
does not function properly, i.e. it is unable to deal efficiently with contagious runs and
maintain financial stability or to resolve large financial firms’ failures in an orderly manner.
A relevant source of complementarities between public and private governance of FIs is
the use of market information to improve the regulatory oversight of the financial system.
The so-called “indirect channel” of market discipline in banking supposes that supervisors
observe bank securities prices in real time and infer reliable signals concerning the default
probabilities of issuing financial firms. To illustrate the modus operandi of indirect (i.e.
supervisor-triggered) market discipline, the banking authorities may use the market signals
embedded in bank securities prices (along with supervisory data and other flows of private
information) when allocating scarce supervisory resources, scheduling on-site exams, cali-
brating off-site surveillance models, setting up risk-adjusted deposit insurance premia or
triggering prompt corrective actions (see Berger, 1991; Flannery, 1998; Evanoff and Wall,
2000).
In practice, the idea of using market signals to facilitate the prudential mission of pub-
lic authorities has recently drawn increasing attention among bank supervisors (see Curry,
Elmer and Fissel, 2004; Schmidt, 2004; Burton and Seale, 2005; Furlong andWilliams, 2006).
The market indicators most often mentioned in supervisory reports are: stock prices; sub-
ordinated debt yield spreads; expected default frequencies (EDFs) and distance-to-default
(DD) indicators extracted from equity values; market capitalization; asset volatility; credit
ratings; and analysts’ opinions.1
In order to assess the disciplinary potential of private market participants, the empirical
literature attempted to determine the extent to which financial market prices accurately
reflect issuers’ financial conditions. The first generation empirical studies point towards
the absence of adequate pricing: bank securities prices poorly reflect the risk profile (see
Berger, 1991; Flannery, 1998). The most plausible explanation for this finding is that during
the eighties market participants perceived a high probability of governmental bailout that
weakened their monitoring incentives (see Flannery and Sorescu, 1996).2 Other studies have
1 In the United States, research projects conducted within the Federal Reserve System have focused
recently on the potential use of information extracted from credit derivatives, such as Credit Default Swap
(CDS) contracts (see e.g. Furlong and Williams, 2006).
2Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004) propose an alternative explanation, which pertains to a supply-side
P F D 3
refined and extended this empirical result (see notably Berger, Davies and Flannery, 2000;
DeYoung, Flannery, Lang and Sorescu, 2001; Evanoff and Wall, 2001, 2002; Jagtiani and
Lemieux, 2001; Covitz, Hancock and Kwast, 2004).
Another strand of this literature examines the ability of market participants to predict
individual bank or system-wide fragility and the potential use of market data to improve
the accuracy of the off-site surveillance models (see Flannery, 1998, and Evanoff and Wall,
2000). Some recent empirical studies (e.g. Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2006; Krainer and
Lopez, 2008) provide evidence that both equity-based measures and yield spreads are useful
for detecting material changes in the ratings assigned to banks by their supervisors or
international agencies. An interesting and intuitive result is that equity market variables
perform less well closer to “default,” while credit spreads seem to have much value for
supervisor only close to “default.”
However, until recently no major, systemic, financial crisis hit developed economies like
the United States or Europe. Consequently, the young but growing empirical literature on
the role of market data in predicting financial distress relies on “soft” definitions of default,
such as external agencies / supervisory rating downgrades. The current global financial
crisis offers a unique opportunity to investigate the leading properties of market indicators
in a highly stressed macro-economic environment, characterized by severe financial distress
and real-life failure episodes among financial firms.
One source of relevant information that has been little explored in the extant empir-
ical literature is the market for bank’s exchange-traded option contracts. However, the
conventional wisdom says that, at least in normal times, the option market is likely to be
informationally more efficient than either equity or bond markets. Indeed, as options are
highly leveraged contracts, the lower transaction costs are likely to facilitate speculation
and improve liquidity, and hence the informational efficiency of the derivative market (see
e.g. Swidler and Wilcox, 2002). Moreover, at least for the largest banking organizations,
the market for option contracts on bank equity is active, deep, and sufficiently liquid to
provide reliable signals to supervisors. The lack of option data for smaller banks should
not prevent researchers to assess the usefulness of market-related indicators extracted from
option prices that are available only for the largest banks. As the current financial crisis
has clearly revealed, the opaqueness and complexity of the largest financial firms’ activities
and risk profiles pose the greatest challenge to supervisors and banking authorities.
Although less research has focused on the informational content of option prices and
their potential use to improve the regulatory oversight of FIs, there is one notable exception.
Swidler and Wilcox (2002) provide evidence that the volatility measure implied by the prices
of options on the banks’ shares co-varies with the market volatility and this covariance
is negatively related with the capital ratio (that is, bank capital reduces the response of
implied volatilities to market volatility). They also show that implied volatilities (IVs)
have lower root-mean-squared-error forecasts of banks’ future share price volatility than
effect in the debt market and the endogeneity of the decision to issue bank debt securities.
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historical volatilities do and hence improve forecasts based solely on historical volatilities.
Finally, they document that IVs are imperfectly correlated with bank share prices and sub-
debt yield spreads. This finding suggests that bank supervisors should add IVs to their
menu of market-based signals actually in use.
While similar in spirit, our study distinguishes from the previous works in several major
respects. First, the empirical studies in this area focused on isolated near-failure events
occurring during “benign” or tranquil sample periods. In contrast, the present paper inves-
tigates the ability of market indicators to flag distress episodes in a stressful financial world,
where a large number of FIs are likely to be at risk of failure. Indeed, the vast majority of
failure events included in our sample have occurred toward the end of the analyzed period
(2007-2008). The recent financial turmoil provides an interesting natural experiment frame-
work that allows us to test directly the hypothesis according to which the market discipline
mechanism does not function properly in times of extreme financial duress and systemic
meltdown.3 Second, compared to Swidler and Wilcox (2002), we take a more straightfor-
ward approach to gauge the usefulness of option market indicators for prudential purposes.
Instead of assessing the ability of IV to forecast actual, future volatilities of share prices, we
use option market indicators to improve the accuracy (predictive power) of time-to-failure
models that are typically conceived to predict failures or material deteriorations in financial
firms’ conditions. Third, in contrast to previous literature, which relies extensively on “soft”
definitions of default (e.g. rating downgrades), we use a narrower definition of financial dis-
tress by focusing on major corporate events, namely significant dividend cuts or dividend
omissions.
To put into perspective the above-mentioned contributions to the literature, we conduct
a comprehensive statistical analysis to assess the ability of early-warning indicators derived
from option prices to predict occurrences of distress in the financial services industry. For
that purpose, we apply alternative empirical specifications to a sample of large US financial
firms (75 banks and 180 financial services firms) based on survival analysis: non-parametric
tests; semi-parametric (Cox proportional hazards) regressions; and parametric (accelerated
failure time) models. Our findings indicate that market indicators extracted from option
prices significantly explain the survival time of distressed financial firms and do a better job
in predicting financial distress than other time-varying covariates typically included in bank
failure models.
The results are relevant to the current debate around the proposals requiring systemically
important financial institutions to issue contingent capital notes, i.e. debt certificates or
subordinated bonds that would automatically convert to common equity when a predefined
idiosyncratic trigger is reached during a systemic crisis (Flannery, 2005, 2009ab; Hart and
Zingales, 2009; Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, 2009; Wall, 2010).
3For illustrative purposes, the Turner Review of global banking regulation published by the Financial Ser-
vices Authority in March 2009 explicitly states: “A reasonable conclusion is that market discipline expressed
via market prices cannot be expected to play a major role in constraining bank risk taking [. . . ]” (Financial
Services Authority, 2009, pp. 46-47)
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Most of the proponents of contingent capital advocate for a market-based conversion trigger
(e.g. equity prices, CDS spreads) on the grounds that the accounting measures are inherently
backward-looking and fail to reflect in a timely manner the true financial conditions of a
large and complex banking organization.4 Yet, the empirical literature remains silent on
the ability of market-based indicators to flag financial problems during episodes of extreme
stress in the financial system. The present study fills this important gap in the literature and
suggests adding market indicators extracted from option prices to the menu of vulnerability
metrics that regulators should intensively monitor, especially during a large-scale financial
turmoil.5
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology
used to construct the time-varying IV indicator extracted from option prices. Section 3
briefly presents the option dataset used in our analysis and the sample selection criteria.
Section 4 presents the empirical methodology employed in our research and the results of
survival analyses. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Extracting IVs from options prices
The first step in our analysis consists in constructing a time-varying forward-looking
measure of risk from the most actively traded option contracts on the largest international
FIs’ equity. As each financial firm has a whole specter of option contracts with different
strike prices and maturities, a natural choice is to compute a standardized measure of IV. In
so doing, we use a methodology that is similar to Swidler and Wilcox (2002). Specifically,
our IV estimates are based on the nearest two “at-the-money” options (i.e. the most liquid
series) — one above and one below the underlying price — using values from the nearest
expiry month options. As it is well known, options are rarely at the money because strike
prices are set at standard intervals for each class. Consequently, we interpolate between the
two IVs to calculate an estimate of the IV for a hypothetically “at-the-money” Call/Put
option. We next average the IVs of the two (Call and Put) option contracts to obtain the
IV for options with the strike price nearest to the underlying stock price. The last stage
includes an interpolation of maturities in order to obtain IV estimates for a hypothetical
at-the-money option having a 30 day constant maturity.
This methodology mirrors the volatility indices calculation commonly used in the market
place. Many volatility indices (e.g. the VIX disseminated by Chicago Board Options Ex-
change) take into account a number of eight options, including a Call and a Put at the two
strike prices closest to the money and the nearest two expirations. Hence, our IV measure is
4For instance, see Flannery (2009a) who notes: “contingent capital driven by a book-valued trigger is
virtually worthless.”
5 In the present paper, we do not advocate in favor of an automatic conversion mechanism of contingent
capital notes based solely on market indicators derived from option prices. Rather, in order to reduce
the incidence of pricing errors in various bank securities markets, one could construct an idiosyncratic
“composite” trigger based on equity prices, sub-debt/CDS spreads, and implied volatilities embedded in
option prices. This idea is left for future work.
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slightly lower because its calculation is based on the “at the money” IV interpolated between
only two options (one strike above and one bellow the underlying price). Individual data
for each option contract are collected from Bloomberg (see infra, Section 3), which offers
options prices directly from exchanges and IVs and other options sensitivities calculations
using a proprietary software. The individual IVs reported by Bloomberg are computed us-
ing the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree model to take into account dividends and the
possibility of early exercise.
3. Data and sample selection
3.1. Option market data
We began by identifying from Bloomberg all banking and financial firms headquartered in
the US for which equity Call and Put options are available and actively traded. We are able
to find 132 banks and 233 financial firms that have exchange-traded options. For each of the
entities included in our sample, we then extract detailed information on their shares’ options
and the corresponding stock indices options contracts. The implied volatility measures for
each option contract (Call/Put, various strike prices and maturities) are also taken from
Bloomberg. The “standardized” IV estimates for each financial firm, each business day of
the analyzed period, are computed using the methodology described in the previous section.
Because not all option contracts began publicly trading at the same time or traded on each
day of the entire period, our sample is unbalanced. The maximum time frame for which
we are able to construct our standardized IV estimates is February 28, 1995 — December
1, 2008. For some financial firms, the sample period for which we have option prices is
however much narrower. To be included in the final sample, the selected entities had to
have a minimum time frame of three years of available market information. This criterion
further reduces our sample to 255 FIs (75 banks and 180 financial services firms).
Descriptive statistics for our main explanatory variable, the Implied Volatility (IV) in-
dicator, are presented in Table 1 (distribution by year). The level of IV was relatively
low (27-30% on average) at the beginning of the considered period (1995—1996), but has
increased during periods of stress in the option market (at about 67% on average in 2008).
Table 1 also shows that the variability of the IV indicator follows similar patterns. The
standard deviation of IV is much higher during recessions and tumultuous periods for the
financial services industry. The maximum values of IV, recorded since the inception of the
subprime crisis (i.e. higher than 450%), are about four times higher than those reached at
the beginning of the analyzed period (1995-1997).
{Table 1}
3.2. Financial distress
As we are interested in the ability of IV to predict financial fragility, our final sample
is restricted to include those financial firms that are actively traded in the equity market
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and for which detailed information on the corresponding Call and Put options are available.
Generally, these are the largest financial firms in the US.6 As a consequence, cases of formal
bankruptcies amongst these large financial firms have been extremely rare, even if one
takes into account the distress events that have occurred toward the end of the analyzed
period (2007-2008). Hence, instead of using outright default as the event variable in our
study, we consider an alternative proxy for financial distress. The idea would be that if
our option market indicators are able to predict such material weakening in firms’ financial
condition, which typically precedes formal bankruptcies or reorganizations, supervisors could
take action sooner in order to correct the problems, force earlier recapitalization or resolve
more efficiently troubled institutions.
Our preferred proxy for financial distress is based on public announcements of dividend
cuts and suspensions. To justify our choice, it is worth noting that the financial literature on
dividend payout in the financial services industry confirms that dividend reductions convey
private information to stakeholders and are an efficient way of unveiling part of the bank
assets opacity (see Slovin, Sushka, and Poloncheck, 1999; Bessler and Nohel, 1996, 2000). In
general, managers of firms operating in the financial services industry exhibit a very strong
reluctance to suspend dividend payouts and avoid cutting dividends unless they face serious
financial problems and have no viable alternative.7 Consequently, the release of dividend
cuts and suspensions constitutes a major and exceptional corporate event per se and pro-
vides, in our view, a strong and reliable signal about the financial conditions of a troubled
FI.8 To reinforce our argument, in the vast majority of dividend reduction cases included in
our sample, we observe systematically subsequent regulatory actions, capital restructuring,
management turnovers or even formal bankruptcies. Conversely, all of the occurrences of
“severe” financial distress (liquidation, bankruptcy, insolvency. . . ) affecting the FIs included
in our sample are preceded, without exceptions, by press releases announcing dividend cuts
and omissions. Consequently, we are confident that public releases of dividend suspensions
6Note that most of the off-site surveillance literature is based on samples that are almost always dominated
by small banks (see Reidhill and O’Keefe, 1997; Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan, 1999, and references therein).
The condition of small banks is interesting, but one of the most important lessons from the experience of
the recent financial crisis is that there are the largest financial institutions that matter more for financial
stability.
7This is especially the case when the firm has a long history of paying a reasonable stable dividend rate.
In our sample of large financial firms, dividend payments have been very common during the second part of
the nineties.
8Note that government regulation may interfere with the bank dividend policy by persuading (or forcing)
bank managers to cut dividends in order to improve solvability. For instance, in the US, the Prompt
Corrective Action (PCA) framework under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) adopted in 1991 requires the suspension of dividend as a mandatory provision if the bank is
found to be “undercapitalized.” Private discussions with US supervisors confirmed that for most (if not all)
banking organizations the decision to cut dividends is made by the regulator and not by the bank’s board.
Consequently, our empirical model may be viewed as one where the market is predicting when supervisors
think the bank’s financial conditions have deteriorated sufficiently to require a dividend cut. Our inclusion
of “non-bank” financial firms helps to address this concern. Moreover, we are not aware of any observable
idiosyncratic measure of bank distress that does not depend in some important way on supervisory judgment.
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and significant dividend cuts are an interesting proxy for financial distress.
We collect detailed information regarding dividend payouts (announcement date; ex-
date; pay date; amount of the announced and previous dividend) by all the financial firms
included in our final sample over the period from the beginning of 1995 through the end
of 2008 from Bloomberg database. Then, we use Dow Jones Factiva to identify among
all dividend payouts the announcements of dividend cuts and omissions that were released
to the financial media: Dow Jones and Reuters newswires; key newspapers such as The
Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Washington Post ; and other sources available
in Factiva. The announcement date is defined as the date of the first published report of
the dividend decrease. Table 2 describes the distribution of the event variable by year and
by subsector (“banks” vs. “financial services firms”). As expected, the announcements of
dividend cuts and omissions occurred during recessions and periods of stress in the financial
services industry.
{Table 2}
3.3. Financial ratios and composite scores
To examine whether option market indicators not only explain the time-to-failure but
also improve the accuracy of traditional models based on financial ratios or contain useful
information not already incorporated in financial reports, we also collect balance-sheet data
from Bloomberg. Accounting information for US financial firms is available on a quarterly
basis but do not cover the entire analyzed period for all the FI included in our sample. Fol-
lowing the previous literature (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Reidhill and O’Keefe,
1997; Gilbert et al., 1999; Gropp et al., 2006), we computed several selected financial ra-
tios that are typically used in traditional off-site surveillance models and mimic the main
dimensions of the supervisory rating: profitability, asset portfolio quality, financial lever-
age, operating efficiency, and the extent to which the financing mix is based on short-term
borrowings. We use the financial ratios in our empirical models either as covariates or as a
composite rating. The composite rating is computed as in Gropp et al. (2006):
• First, we compute the following financial ratios for each FI at the end of each quarter
from 1994 through 2008: (i) return on assets (%); (ii) non-performing assets to total
assets (%); (iii) total debt to common equity (%); (iv) operating efficiency ratio (%);
and (v) short-term borrowing to total liabilities and equity (%);
• Second, we inferre the percentile ranking of each FI in each quarter distribution of the
five financial ratios;
• Third, we forme four groups with respect to the quartiles of each distribution;
• Four, we assign a score varying from 0 (the best class) to 3 (the worst class) to each
FI according to its position in the four groups of each financial ratio;
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• Five, we aggregate the individual scores for each financial ratio into a composite rating.
As the financial ratios, the composite rating is available on a quarterly basis and is some-
times missing for some FIs, particularly at the beginning of our sample period. Descriptive
statistics for the main explanatory variables are presented in Table 3.
{Tables 3}
4. The usefulness of IVs from a micro-prudential perspective
4.1. Empirical specifications
In order to assess the ability of market-based indicators to flag troubled FI and the poten-
tial use of our risk metrics for supervisory purposes, we employ survival analysis techniques
that despite their relevance are rarely used in the literature on early-warning indicators in
banking (see e.g. Cole and Gunther, 1995). To our knowledge, the only exception in the
recent literature is Gropp et al. (2006); however, they only use Cox proportional hazard
models, which may be unsuitable when the log hazard ratio function is not constant over
time.
Survival analysis formalizes the time-to-failure variable as a probability density function
of time f(t) or, in its more convenient form, as a survivor function S(t) = P (T > t),
describing the probability of surviving beyond time t. The probability that the failure event
occurs in a given interval [t; t + dt), conditional upon the FI having survived to time t, is
expressed as:
P [t ≤ T < t+ dt|T > t] (1)
This probability divided by the width of the interval gives the instantaneous rate of
failure or hazard function, i.e. the average (limiting) probability of surviving per unit time
period over the interval [t; t+ dt):
h(t) = lim
dt→0
P [t ≤ T < t+ dt|T > t]
dt
=
f(t)
S(t)
(2)
Our empirical approach rests on two different specifications. The first one is based on a
Cox proportional hazard (PH) or multiplicative model of the form:
h (t|IV,X1, X2, ..., Xn) = h0 (t) · g (IV,X1, X2, ...,Xn) (3)
where h(·) represents the proportional hazard function, IV the IV measure of bank risk,
X1, X2, ...,Xn a set of control variables, h0 (t) the baseline hazard, and g(·) a nonnegative
function of the covariates. The choice commonly adopted in the survival analysis literature
is to let g(·) equal the relative risk, g (IV,X1,X2, ..., Xn) = e
β0IV+β1X1+β2X2+...+βnXn . The
survival model allows for censoring in the sense that not all FIs included in our final sample
experienced a “failure” during the analyzed period (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980, for
more details on the estimation of survival models).
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A crucial assumption behind the Cox proportional hazards specification is that the haz-
ard ratio is proportionally distributed over time. To evaluate this assumption, we perform a
test of nonzero slope in a generalized linear regression of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals on
various functions of time (see Grambsch and Therneau, 1994). The test is equivalent to eval-
uate the hypothesis that the log hazard ratio function is constant over time. Although the
null hypothesis of zero slope in the appropriate regressions is accepted for some individual
discrete covariates, the global test indicate in many cases deviations from the proportional
hazards assumption.
To tackle this econometric issue, Gropp et al. (2006) replace in their models the con-
tinuous market indicator (i.e. the time-varying covariate) by a dummy variable taking the
value of 1 if the indicator is higher than the third quartile of its distribution and 0 other-
wise. In this manner, their PH model is no longer rejected because of the violation of the
proportional hazard assumption. However, besides the arbitrariness behind the cut-off value
chosen in the definition of the dummy variable, some relevant information is likely to be
lost when the continuous market indicator is converted to a dummy variable. Consequently,
in the present paper we use a second specification based on an alternative modeling choice:
the accelerated failure-time (AFT) model.
The AFT specification supposes a linear relationship between the logarithm of the sur-
vival time ln (tj) and the covariates Xj
ln (tj) = Xjβ + ǫj (7)
where ǫj is the error with density ϕ(). The assumption on the distributional form of
the error term determines the class of the regression models. Particularly, assuming a
normal, logistic, extreme-value or three-parameter gamma distribution for the error term,
the corresponding regression models are lognormal, log-logistic, Weibull and generalized
gamma, respectively. In the present paper, we opt for the log-logistic model, commonly
used in the banking literature (see e.g. Cole and Gunther, 1995). To justify our choice and
discriminate between various AFT models, we compute for each estimated AFT model the
log likelihood and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). According to our comparisons,
the log-logistic model appears to be the best-fitting model (i.e. exhibiting the largest log
likelihood) and the one with the smallest AIC value.
4.2. Empirical results
Preliminary evidence: non-parametric tests. Before presenting in greater detail
the results of our (semi-)parametric analysis, we aim at drawing some preliminary infer-
ences about the way different covariates affect the patterns of the estimated survivor and
cumulative hazard functions. The idea behind the nonparametric approach adopted in this
section is to let the data talk for itself without making any assumption about the probability
distribution of time to failure. The effects of covariates of interest (i.e. the IV indicator
and composite rating), although not modeled explicitly, are analyzed at a basic qualitative
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level, in a graphical and descriptive statistical manner.
Figures 1 depicts the Nelson-Aalen curve estimated for the overall sample, suggesting a
step increase of the estimated cumulative hazard function after the Summer 2007 (analysis
time > 4,500 days). Figures 2a and 2b allow to draw preliminary statistical inferences about
the impact of the IV indicator and composite score on the survivor functions S(t), i.e. the
probability of failing after time t or alternatively the probability of survival past time t.
Both figures depict Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function across key values of
the covariates (low IV value vs. high IV value and low score vs. high score respectively).
The IV (score) value is “high” if IV (score) takes larger values than the top 10th percentile
of the distribution of IV (score) in the overall sample.9 Note that a high IV (score) value
characterizes FIs in bad financial conditions. As expected, FIs perceived by the market as
being in bad shape have a worse survival experience than the “control” group, i.e. FIs for
which the IV indicator takes lower values (see figure 2a). The same difference in survival
patterns holds when we plot the survivor function with respect to key values of the composite
score (see figure 2b). However, the difference is less pronounced in this case.
{Figures 1, 2a & 2b}
We also conduct formal tests of hypothesis for the equality of survivor functions across
the two subgroups defined with respect to the IV value. The tests, based on the work
of Peto and Peto (1972) and Prentice (1978), use as weight function an estimate of the
overall survivor function similar to the Kaplan-Meier estimator and are not susceptible to
differences in censoring patterns across groups. Compared with other tests for equality of
survivor functions (such as the log-rank test or Wilcoxon test), the Peto-Peto-Prentice test
is designed for the special cases when the hazard functions are supposed to vary in ways
other than proportionally. Since we suspect that the survival experiences of “banks” and
“financial services firms” may differ, we perform a “stratified” test. Precisely, we perform the
tests separately for each stratum (“banks” vs. “financial services firms”) and then combine
the results into one overall statistic (“overall sample”). As revealed by the data reported in
Table 4, both “banks” and “financial services firms” exhibit significantly different survival
experience across the two subgroups defined with respect to the IV value (low vs. high). In
addition, the overall chi squared statistic also rejects the hypothesis for equality of survivor
function and suggests that the IV indicator is a significant explanatory factor of the time
to failure.
{Table 4}
Semi-parametric survival models. To refine our preliminary findings, Table 5
presents the estimation results from Cox Proportional Hazards regressions using various
9 In alternative specifications we also used the median and 75th percentile of the distribution of IV (score)
in the overall sample to define the two subgroups (low IV/score vs. high IV/score). The survivor patterns
are quite comparable to those depicted in figures 2a & 2b.
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sets of basic time-varying covariates based on the IV indicator. In order to relax the as-
sumption that banks and other non-bank financial services firms face the same hazard of
failure over time, the PH models are estimated on various subsamples and on the global
sample including a bank dummy variable (in the last case, we assume implicitly that the
hazard functions for banks and financial services firms have the same shape). To obtain a
single, more efficient estimate of the impact of the IV indicator on the survival time, we also
perform a stratified analysis. Since we suspect that there is possible dependence among FIs’
failure times within various subgroups, the variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients is
corrected for clustering using the method described in Lin and Wei (1989). To ease the
interpretation of results, we report estimated coefficients in Table 5, not hazard ratios, as
well as p-values in parenthesis, below each coefficient estimate.
{Table 5}
Whatever the estimated specification, we obtain reasonably similar results. The hazard
ratio is increasing in the value of the IV indicator, which is consistent with the nonparametric
tests described in the previous section. For illustration purposes, a 10% increase in the
continuous IV indicator increases the hazard by 17-20% (i.e. exp(.016×10)). The coefficient
of the bank dummy variable suggests that commercial banks face almost twice of the hazard
of non-bank financial services firms (i.e. exp(.662)). We also report in Table 6 the results for
tests of the proportional-hazard assumption based on analysis of residuals. Globally, the null
hypothesis of zero slope is strongly rejected when the IV continuous variable is used in the
Cox regressions.10 To tackle this econometric issue, we take two distinct approaches. First,
following Gropp et al. (2006) we replace in our various models the continuous IV indicator
(i.e. the time-varying covariate) by a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if IV value is
higher than the 90th percentile of its distribution and 0 otherwise.11 Inspecting Table 5, the
PH specification is no longer rejected because of the violation of the proportional hazard
assumption and the IV dummy covariate is positive and significant at the 1% level. That is,
financial firms exhibiting high IV values are much more likely to cut and/or omit dividends
and face subsequent financial problems.
However, as already noted, besides the arbitrariness behind the trigger chosen in the
definition of the IV dummy variable, some relevant information is likely to be lost when
the continuous IV indicator is converted to a dummy. Consequently, we also use a second
empirical approach that relies on an alternative modeling choice: the accelerated failure-time
(AFT) estimations. The results of the AFT models will be discussed at length in the next
section.
10The Grambsch and Therneau (1994) tests of the proportional-hazards assumption assume homogeneity of
variance across subgroups. This assumption may not hold in the special case of the stratified Cox regression.
That’s why the proportional-hazards assumption is checked in this case separately for each stratum.
11Alternatively, we also used the median and 75th percentile of the distribution of IV to define the IV
dummy variable. The results are basically the same, both in terms of statistical significance and economic
magnitude: the coefficient estimates of the IV dummy defined with respect to the median and top 25th
quartile values are 2.40*** (p-value < .000) and 2.80*** (p-value < .000) respectively (output omitted ).
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To examine whether market indicators extracted from option prices do a better job in
predicting financial distress than other time-varying covariates typically included in bank
failure models, we rerun the Cox PH models including the composite rating based on fi-
nancial ratios.12 The results reported in Table 6 confirm that the composite rating has
significant explanatory power in explaining time to failure. The coefficient of the composite
score is always positive and significant at the conventional levels (at least 5%), indicating
that financial firms in bad financial conditions (i.e. exhibiting a high score) are more likely
to face financial distress.
{Table 6}
However, when we add the option market indicators to the composite rating, the coeffi-
cient estimates of the composite score decrease systematically in economic magnitude and
pale in significance. Moreover, the goodness of fit of the Cox PH models including both
covariates (IV and score) improves significantly relative to models including composite score
alone, as revealed by simple comparisons of the associated Wald statistics.13 This suggests
that the two predictors of financial distress are somewhat complementary to each other
and the option market indicator add some information to that already incorporated in FIs’
balance-sheets. As before, the proportional hazards assumption is strongly rejected most
probably because the existence of strong non-linearities in the relationship between the IV
continuous variable and time-to-failure.
Results from the parametric (log-logistic) regressions. An efficient way to ex-
ploit the relevant information embedded in the continuous nature of the IV and financial
ratios variables is to estimate accelerated failure-time (AFT) models. Fitting parametric
survival models allows us to avoid obvious difficulties in properly interpreting the results
obtained from miss-specified Cox PH regressions when the proportional hazard assumption
is unambiguously rejected. The results of the AFT models estimated on various samples
and including different combinations of covariates are reported in Table 7. To ease the com-
parisons, it is worth noting that, for computational reasons, the results presented in Table 7
are expressed in the accelerated failure-time (AFT) metric. This is very important because
negative coefficient estimates translate into a positive impact on the hazard of “failure”,
whereas a positive coefficient estimate implies that a change in the covariate decreases the
hazard.
{Table 7}
12 In alternative specifications, we also included the financial ratios variables on an individual basis, but the
Cox proportional hazard assumption was systematically rejected according to the results of the zero slope
tests. Hence, to save space we decided not to report these additional results.
13The piecewise correlation coefficients between quarterly averages of daily IV data and quarter-end com-
posite score indicate a positive but imperfect correlation: +0.143*** (p-value < .000) in the overall sample;
+0.317*** (p-value < .000) in the “banks” subsample; and +0.192*** (p-value < .000) in the “financial ser-
vices firms” subsample. As pointed out by Bliss (2001), statistical theory indicates that combining various
signals that are not perfectly correlated produce a more accurate assessment than either one alone.
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We begin by estimating simple parametric models and including progressively in the
regressions each of the relevant covariates and then combinations of IV, composite rating,
and various financial ratios. The continuous and dummy IV variables, as well as the com-
posite score and some financial variables, have significant explanatory power. It is worth
noting that the parametric approach allows us to assess the predictive ability of the selected
financial ratios on an individual basis. Looking at the financial ratios individually, the most
powerful predictors of financial distress are the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets
and the financial leverage. To ascertain whether IV indicators do a better job in predict-
ing financial distress than accounting ratios, we compute Wald test statistics for the null
hypothesis that (i) all covariates coefficients equal zero; (ii) all financial ratios coefficients
equal zero; and (iii) IV coefficient is equal to zero. Simple comparisons of various Wald
statistics reported at the bottom of Table 7 confirm that the IV indicator, composite rating,
as well as financial ratios taken jointly have significant predictive power in explaining time
to failure. However, the most significant contribution to the goodness of fit measure of each
“hybrid” model, including both IV and accounting ratios, is due to the IV indicator.
Explaining survival probabilities in a high-stress financial world. To test the
ability of the IV indicator to explain the conditional survival probabilities in a high-stress
financial world, we rerun all the previous empirical models, semi-parametric as well as
parametric, by focusing on the end of the analyzed period. The sampling period for this
robustness analysis starts in January 2006 to guarantee that we have at least some past
observations for the financial firms that announced dividend cuts and/or omissions in the
first half of 2007. The results of the CPH and AFT models estimated on the sub-sample
2006-2008 and including various combinations of covariates are reported in Table 8a (semi-
parametric regressions) and Table 8b (parametric regressions).
{Tables 8a&8b}
As it is well known, Cox PH regressions operate only on dates when “failures” actually
occur and are in fact a series of conditional logistic regressions, one taking place at each
failure time. Since the vast majority of “failure” events (about 80%) are concentrated during
the tumultuous period 2006-2008, we expect little differences between the results obtained
by running CPH regressions on the overall sample and on the stress period. Indeed, the
results reported in Table 8a are comparable and fully consistent with the previous findings
depicted in Tables 5 & 6. Note that we only report in Table 8a those models for which
the PH assumption holds, i.e. the proportional-hazards test statistic based on Schoenfeld
residuals is not significant at the 5% level.
Compared with Cox PH regressions, AFT models are substantially different in the way
they exploit the information contained in the data-generating process to obtain coefficient
estimates. Particularly, in contrast to Cox PH model, where the choice of time origin plays
no significant role, in parametric models the definition of the precise moment when the
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clock starts ticking is crucial.14 Consequently, our robustness analysis is more relevant in
the particular case of parametric models. The results reported in Table 8b confirm that
the continuous and dummy IV variables, as well as the composite score, have significant
explanatory power and are powerful predictors of financial distress. However, the coefficients
of the financial ratios taken individually lose significance (see models 4& 5, Table 8b).
In-sample predictive accuracy, covariate-adjusted survivor functions, and
miss-classification errors. An interesting extension to the results reported in previ-
ous sections is to investigate the in-sample classification accuracy of the various survival
models over the high-stress episode located towards the end of our sample period. For this
purpose, we begin by computing the covariate-adjusted survivor functions based on three
distinct Cox PH models estimated over the 2006—2008 period (see also Table 8a):15 (i)
a model including only the IV market-based indicator as explanatory variable; (ii) an al-
ternative model including the composite score as the main independent variable; and (iii)
an integrating model including both the IV indicator and composite score. The estimated
hazard ratios in all models are significant at the 5% level. Conditional on the estimates
of the hazard ratios from the Cox models, we are able to compute a covariate-adjusted
Kaplan-Meier estimate of the “survivor” function, i.e. a probability of survival past time t
given survival to time t0, given a value for covariate for each observation and the estimated
model parameters (hazard ratios).16
{Figure 3}
Figure 3 displays in a convenient manner the estimated conditional survivor functions for
two sub-groups: (1) FIs having high IV indicators / composite scores; (2) FIs exhibiting low
IV indicators / composite scores. The log rank tests for the equality of survivor functions
across the two sub-groups of firms indicate significance at the 1% level in all three cases.
Following Gropp et al. (2006), we also report in Table 9 the proportion of FIs that did
not cut dividends for a certain period of time and having certain characteristics. Precisely, if
we consider the model including the IV indicator as the main explanatory variable, we may
infer that after one year, 94% (42%) of FIs with low (high) IVs did not face a distress event.
If we define type I and II classification errors in a standard way, i.e. as “missed failures”
and “miss-classified survivals” respectively, it follows that 6% of FIs were classified as good
even though they experienced a failure event (type I error) and 42% were classified as being
in bad shape even though they did not experience a distress event (type II error). The
discriminatory power of the model based on the IV indicator only is of 52% after one year
and increases over time. Note that, compared to the IV model, the Cox model including
14This is because in parametric models the origin of the analysis time determines when the risk of failure
begins accumulating.
15Because of computational constraints, we report the in-sample predictive accuracy of the Cox PH models
only.
16 In our case, the probability of “survival” refers to the event that a financial institution is not experiencing
a dividend cut or suspension.
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the composite score generates a much higher number of type II errors (63% vs. 42%) and a
slightly higher number of occurrences of “missed failures” (9% vs. 6%). As a consequence,
the model including both the IV indicator and composite score exhibits a somewhat lower
discriminatory power than the model based on the IV indicator alone. This result is robust
to the cut-off value used in the definition of the two sub-groups of FIs (high vs. low IV /
composite score).
{Table 9}
5. Conclusion
Both theoretical and empirical literature convincingly argue that private market partic-
ipants (shareholders, debtholders, large counterparts in derivative markets. . . ) are able to
fairly identify risky institutions when the financial system is in good shape. This result is
based on the quality of the Hayekian information disseminating process accompanying the
price formation alchemy. At the same time, there is a broad consensus that market signals
often become erratic and extremely volatile during times of stress, when investors face severe
aggregate shocks and markets may stop functioning because systemic risk is at stake. The
global financial crisis that broke out in the Summer 2007 provides a unique opportunity to
test directly the validity of such a broad consensus and to investigate the leading properties
of market signals in a highly stressed environment, characterized by a significant number of
failure episodes in the financial services industry.
In this paper, we pursue this new direction in the empirical literature and focus on a po-
tential source of information that has been overlooked so far in this research area: the market
for exchange-traded option contracts on financial firms’ equity. Particularly, we use option
market indicators to improve the accuracy of survival models conceived to predict material
deteriorations in financial firms’ conditions. Our results indicate that market indicators
extracted from option prices significantly explain time-to-failure of distressed financial firms
and perform at least as well in predicting financial distress as other time-varying covariates
typically included in bank failure models. Overall, both accounting information and option
prices contain useful information of subsequent financial problems and, more importantly,
the combination produces reasonably good forecasts in a high-stress financial world, full of
doubts and uncertainties.
*****
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Figure 1: Nonparametric estimate of the cumulative hazard function, overall sample 
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, overall sample 
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Figure 3: Covariate-adjusted survivor functions based on Cox PH models (2006—2008) 
 
(Χ
2
 = 70.51; p<.001) 
 
(Χ
2
 = 30.36; p<.001) 
 
(Χ
2
 = 84.70; p<.001) 
  
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 200 400 600 800
Analysis time
High IV Low IV
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 200 400 600 800
Analysis time
High Score Low Score 
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 200 400 600 800
Analysis time
High IV&Score Low IV&Score 
 PREDICTING FINANCIAL DISTRESS 22 
Table 1: Implied Volatility (IV) indicator (%), by year 
Year N Mean St. dev. Min Q1 Median Q2 Max 
1995 9070 26.77 10.22 7.76 20.33 24.67 30.42 128.42 
1996 12061 29.08 9.66 11.40 22.81 26.64 33.01 108.87 
1997 15210 33.06 11.25 6.90 25.67 30.69 37.27 115.05 
1998 22885 39.44 18.16 13.74 29.17 34.74 43.04 239.74 
1999 28476 42.74 19.84 5.30 30.22 37.15 47.88 199.96 
2000 25284 48.85 21.74 7.18 35.01 42.90 55.90 225.36 
2001 26955 42.37 18.77 9.59 30.10 37.53 49.26 279.88 
2002 31850 42.54 18.44 14.08 31.02 37.76 48.03 225.90 
2003 35488 35.91 16.34 13.31 26.10 32.02 39.78 187.27 
2004 39593 31.64 12.79 10.02 23.42 28.91 35.97 213.09 
2005 42361 24.23 9.67 8.48 18.08 21.47 27.71 334.05 
2006 46963 24.95 9.52 6.52 18.57 22.30 28.73 102.31 
2007 57324 35.18 22.13 7.28 22.52 30.22 40.74 450.12 
2008 55668 67.23 43.53 13.71 39.80 52.97 79.90 490.90 
Total 449188 38.81 25.21 5.30 24.22 32.55 44.10 490.90 
Notes: This table presents the time evolution of the IV variable. The “standardized” measure of IV is based on the nearest 
two “at-the-money” options series -- one above and one below the underlying price -- using values from the nearest expiry 
month options. We next interpolate between the two IVs to calculate an estimate of the IV for a hypothetically “at-the-money” 
Call/Put option. Finally, we average the IVs of the two (Call and Put) option contracts to obtain the IV for options with the strike 
price nearest to the underlying bank stock price. The IVs are computed using the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree model to 
take into account the possibility of early exercise. 
Source: authors’ computations based on data extracted from Bloomberg 
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Table 2: Dividend cuts and suspensions, by sub-sector and year 
Year Overall sample Banks Financial services firms 
1995 0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0 
1998 2 1 1 
1999 0 0 0 
2000 4 0 4 
2001 4 1 3 
2002 0 0 0 
2003 6 0 6 
2004 1 0 1 
2005 5 1 4 
2006 0 0 0 
2007 19 5 14 
2008 70 35 35 
Total 111 43 68 
Notes:  This table describes the distribution of the event variable by year and by subsector 
(“banks” vs. “financial services firms”). The financial distress variable was constructed using a 
twostep procedure. First, we collect from Bloomberg detailed information regarding dividend 
payouts by all the financial firms included in our final sample over the 1995-2008 period. Second, 
we use Dow Jones Factiva to identify among all dividend payouts the announcements of dividend 
cuts and omissions that were released to the financial media: Dow Jones and Reuters newswires; 
key newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Washington Post etc.; and 
other sources available in Factiva. 
Source: authors’ computations based on data extracted from Bloomberg and Dow Jones 
Factiva. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on the main variables 
Panel A: Overall sample 
Variable name N Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Total Assets 621617 47021.81 1.7e+05 0.57 1304.44 4096.80 12401.55 2.4e+06 
Implied Volatility 449188 38.81 25.21 5.30 24.22 32.55 44.10 490.90 
Composite Score 287290 6.43 2.61 0.00 5.00 7.00 8.00 12.00 
Return on Assets 592427 4.02 7.18 –62.10 1.12 1.76 4.93 87.03 
Non-performing Assets / Tot Assets 418415 0.51 1.12 0.00 0.11 0.30 0.52 26.95 
Tot Debt / Common Equity 621124 366.44 1020.86 0.00 73.59 158.29 306.54 39674.62 
Efficiency Ratio 402053 68.35 641.98 –3173.09 50.89 59.78 68.40 45150.00 
Sh-term Borrow / Tot Liab & Equity 620614 16.32 18.76 0.00 1.82 9.52 24.72 101.78 
Panel B: "Banks" subsample 
Total Assets 225799 71161.96 2.2e+05 205.26 4811.81 10018.29 31202.15 2.4e+06 
Implied Volatility 148690 34.69 21.88 5.30 22.46 29.94 38.97 410.36 
Composite Score 177329 7.17 2.05 1.00 6.00 7.00 9.00 12.00 
Return on Assets 220497 1.25 0.56 –5.80 1.01 1.28 1.55 4.98 
Non-performing Assets / Tot Assets 181745 0.50 0.71 0.00 0.23 0.37 0.56 15.66 
Tot Debt / Common Equity 225799 248.07 174.18 0.00 127.38 216.25 320.01 1146.19 
Efficiency Ratio 228647 57.15 18.91 –174.03 51.58 58.15 63.41 744.35 
Sh-term Borrow / Tot Liab & Equity 225799 10.59 8.34 0.00 4.50 8.99 14.72 75.47 
Panel A: "Financial services firms" subsample 
Total Assets 395818 33250.77 1.3e+05 0.57 755.78 2169.47 5859.33 1.2e+06 
Implied Volatility 300498 40.85 26.47 6.52 25.22 34.15 46.97 490.90 
Composite Score 109961 5.24 2.96 0.00 3.00 5.00 8.00 12.00 
Return on Assets 371930 5.66 8.64 –62.10 1.53 3.81 7.33 87.03 
Non-performing Assets / Tot Assets 236670 0.51 1.35 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.47 26.95 
Tot Debt / Common Equity 395325 434.05 1267.87 0.00 52.34 121.94 281.45 39674.62 
Efficiency Ratio 173406 83.12 977.09 –3173.09 48.11 65.69 78.38 45150.00 
Sh-term Borrow / Tot Liab & Equity 394815 19.60 22.00 0.00 0.28 11.15 34.42 101.78 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on key financial variables measuring four main dimensions of the financial firms’ 
performance (risk, profitability, efficiency, and capitalization), option market indicator, composite score and other control variables 
calculated separately for the full sample and two sub-samples of firms: “banks” and “financial services firms.” See text for definition 
of variables. 
Source: authors’ computations based on data extracted from Bloomberg 
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Table 4: Stratified tests for equality of survivor functions 
    Panel A: Overall sample 
Subgroups based on IV Events observed Events expected* Sum of ranks
T
 
   Low IV value  16 66.44 –39.881 
   High IV value 88 37.56 39.881 
Total   104   104.00   0 
Chi Square Statistic        193.72***     
Panel B: "Banks" subsample 
Subgroups based on IV Events observed Events expected Sum of ranks 
   Low IV value  8 26.03 –13.470 
   High IV value 34 15.97 13.470 
Total   42   42.00   0 
Chi Square Statistic        54.51***     
Panel C: "Financial services firms" subsample 
Subgroups based on IV Events observed Events expected Sum of ranks 
   Low IV value  8 40.42 –25.954 
   High IV value 54 21.58 25.954 
Total   62   62.00   0 
Chi Square Statistic        146.11***     
Notes: This table presents overall and within-stratum tests based on Peto and Peto (1972) and Prentice (1978). 
The test statistics use as the weight function an estimate of the Kaplan-Meier survivor function. Compared with other 
tests for equality of survivor functions, this test is designed for the special cases when the hazard functions are 
supposed to vary in ways other than proportionally. The test is not affected by differences in censoring patterns 
across subgroups/stratum. 
*** statistical significance at the 1% level  
T
 sum over calculations within strata 
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Table 5: Results from Cox Proportional Hazards regressions: IV indicator 
Independent 
Variable 
Overall sample "Banks" subsample 
"Financial services 
firms" subsample 
Stratified 
estimations
T
 
IV continuous 0.016*** 0.017***   0.016***   0.018***   0.017*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IV dummy 3.374*** 3.430*** 2.807*** 3.695*** 3.377*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank dummy 0.662*** 0.540*** 
      (0.001) (0.008)             
No. of firms 255 255 255 255 75 75 180 180 255 255 
No. of div. cuts 104 104 104 104 42 42 62 62 104 104 
Log likelihood –501.2 –477.0 –496.2 –473.6 –163.4 –152.3 –262.5 –252.6 –426.1 –405.8 
Wald test 167.0*** 113.8*** 167.9*** 116.8*** 30.2*** 31.7*** 122.3*** 75.4*** 152.6*** 104.6*** 
Prop.-haz. test 10.74*** 0.02 11.51*** 0.27 8.37*** 0.12 5.56** 0.92 12.5
T
*** 0.01
T
 
Notes: This table presents the estimation results from Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) regressions using various sets of basic 
time-varying covariates based on IV level. The dependent variable is the time-to-failure, i.e. the duration (measured in days) until 
the announcement of a dividend cut / suspension or censoring. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. Coefficients, not 
hazard ratios, are reported; p-values are reported in parenthesis, below each coefficient estimate. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
T
 The Grambsch and Therneau (1994) tests of the proportional-hazards assumption assume homogeneity of variance across 
subgroups. This assumption may not hold in the special case of the stratified Cox regression. That’s why the proportional-hazards 
assumption was checked in this case separately for each stratum. 
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Table 6: Results from Cox Proportional Hazards regressions: IV indicator and composite score based on time-varying financial ratios 
Independent Variable Overall sample "Banks" subsample 
"Financial services 
firms" subsample 
Stratified estimations
T
 
Composite score 0.337*** 0.246*** 0.201*** 0.352*** 0.185** 0.620*** 0.487*** 0.187*** 0.095** 0.348*** 0.228*** 0.177** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) 
IV continuous 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IV dummy 3.216*** 3.290*** 3.440*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank dummy –0.343 0.232 
        (0.201) (0.334)               
No of firms 126 126 126 126 126 71 71 55 55 126 126 126 
No of dividend cuts 62 61 61 62 61 40 39 22 22 62 61 61 
Log (pseudo-)likelihood –278.5 –246.5 –234.1 –277.7 –233.8 –148.1 –133.9 –83.6 –67.5 –237.9 –206.9 –193.4 
Wald test 17.2*** 103.9*** 59.2*** 21.75*** 59.42*** 34.72*** 79.15*** 5.30** 34.63*** 19.14*** 102.41*** 44.34*** 
Proportional-hazards test 11.29*** 11.62*** 3.23 10.25*** 3.86 7.86*** 7.97** 0.28 10.53*** 8.64
T
*** 11.06
T
*** 2.44
T
 
Notes: This table presents the estimation results from Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) regressions using various sets of basic time-varying covariates based on IV and composite rating 
levels. The dependent variable is the time-to-failure, i.e. the duration (measured in days) until the announcement of a dividend cut / suspension or censoring. Standard errors are corrected 
for clustering. Coefficients, not hazard ratios, are reported; p-values are reported in parenthesis, below each coefficient estimate. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
T
 The Grambsch and Therneau (1994) tests of the proportional-hazards assumption assume homogeneity of variance across subgroups. This assumption may not hold in the special case 
of the stratified Cox regression. That’s why the proportional-hazards assumption was checked in this case separately for each stratum. 
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Table 7: Results from “parametric” (log-logistic) survival-time models: IV indicator, composite score and firm-specific time-varying financial ratios 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
IV continuous –0.014*** –0.007*** –0.008*** –0.009*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
IV dummy –0.780*** –0.463*** –0.472*** –0.698*** 
(0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Composite score –0.034** –0.046* –0.046*** 
(0.014) (0.056) (0.006) 
Return on Assets 0.005 0.006 0.006* 0.007*** 0.003 0.005* 
(0.431) (0.426) (0.060) (0.004) (0.480) (0.095) 
Non-perf Assets / Tot Assets –0.043*** –0.042*** –0.020* –0.024*** –0.023 –0.029*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.084) (0.003) (0.222) (0.000) 
Tot Debt / Common Equity –0.000** –0.000** –0.000 –0.000* –0.000 –0.000** 
(0.013) (0.048) (0.350) (0.063) (0.235) (0.016) 
Efficiency Ratio –0.000 –0.000 –0.000* –0.000** –0.000** –0.000* 
(0.268) (0.263) (0.081) (0.049) (0.027) (0.092) 
ST Borrow / Tot Liab & Equity 0.001 0.003 0.005** 0.002 0.005** 
(0.494) (0.205) (0.010) (0.486) (0.019) 
Bank dummy –0.148** –0.291*** 
(0.049) (0.006) 
Constant 9.377*** 8.834*** 8.819*** 8.624*** 8.618*** 9.361*** 9.068*** 9.035*** 8.692*** 9.209*** 8.973*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No of firms 255 255 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
No of dividend cuts 104 104 62 62 62 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Ancillary/Gamma 0.147 0.135 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.081 0.079 0.082 0.079 0.085 0.078 
Log (pseudo-)likelihood 32.41 32.15 23.70 22.48 22.86 67.20 67.18 62.05 63.42 64.10 66.91 
Wald test (all covariates) 27.76*** 50.01*** 6.01** 38.43*** 29.42*** 32.93*** 55.27*** 46.79*** 142.98*** 46.65*** 192.35*** 
Wald test (financial ratios) . . 6.01** 38.43*** 29.42*** 3.65* 7.46*** 9.60* 28.49*** 11.69** 35.82*** 
Wald test (implied volatility) 27.76*** 50.01*** . . . 11.35*** 27.30*** 15.29*** 46.39*** 12.54*** 47.75*** 
AIC –58.81 –58.30 –41.40 –32.97 –31.72 –126.41 –126.37 –108.09 –110.84 –110.2039 –115.8251 
Notes: This table presents the estimation results from the log-logistic regressions using various sets of time-varying covariates. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the survival 
time, i.e. the duration (measured in days) until the announcement of a dividend cut / suspension or censoring. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. For computational reasons, it is worth 
noting that the results presented in this table are expressed in the accelerated failure-time (AFT) metric, e.g. negative coefficient estimates translate into a positive impact on the hazard of 
“failure”, whereas a positive coefficient estimate implies that a change in the covariate decreases the hazard. P-values are reported in parentheses, below each coefficient estimate.  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
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Table 8a: Explaining survival probabilities in a high-stress financial world (2006--2008) 
I. Cox Proportional Hazards regressions 
Independent Variable Overall sample Stratified estimations
T
 
IV dummy 2.609*** 2.582*** 1.686*** 1.681*** 2.565*** 1.688*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Composite score 
  
0.257*** 0.259*** 
 
0.255*** 
   
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
Bank dummy 0.581*** –0.025 
    (0.002)   (0.925)     
No of firms 255 255 126 126 255 126 
No of div cuts 88 88 57 57 88 57 
Log (pseudo-)likelihood –429.25 –425.8 –236.0 –236.0 –366.7 –199.7 
Wald test 70.51*** 98.59*** 81.79*** 81.77*** 66.17*** 83.48*** 
Proportional-hazards test 2.52 2.93 3.98 6.54* 2.75* 4.67* 
Notes: This table presents the estimation results over the period 2006--2008 from Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) 
regressions using various sets of basic time-varying covariates based on IV and composite rating levels. The dependent 
variable is the time-to-failure, i.e. the duration (measured in days) until the announcement of a dividend cut / suspension or 
censoring. We only report CPH models for which the proportional hazards assumption holds, i.e. the PH test statistic is not 
significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. Coefficients, not hazard ratios, are reported; p-values 
are reported in parenthesis, below each coefficient estimate. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
T
 The Grambsch and Therneau (1994) tests of the proportional-hazards assumption assume homogeneity of variance across 
subgroups. This assumption may not hold in the special case of the stratified Cox regression. That’s why the proportional-
hazards assumption was checked in this case separately for each stratum.  
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Table 8b: Explaining survival probabilities in a high-stress financial world (2006--2008): II. Accelerated Failure-Time models 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
IV continuous –0.009*** –0.005*** –0.006* –0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.056) (0.005) 
IV dummy –0.413*** –0.285*** –0.342** –0.303** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.015) 
Composite score –0.020*** –0.040*** –0.032** 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.015) 
Return on Assets 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 –0.004 0.000 
(0.557) (0.560) (0.464) (0.709) (0.225) (0.984) 
Non-perf Ass / Tot Assets –0.056 –0.055 –0.049* –0.067** –0.079*** –0.058** 
(0.282) (0.324) (0.073) (0.020) (0.010) (0.015) 
Tot Debt / Common Equity –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000*** –0.000*** –0.000*** 
(0.114) (0.123) (0.258) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) 
Efficiency Ratio –0.000 –0.000 –0.000** –0.000 –0.000** –0.000 
(0.573) (0.576) (0.015) (0.194) (0.021) (0.261) 
ST Borrow / Tot Liab & Eq 0.000 0.001 0.001 –0.002 0.000 
(0.988) (0.503) (0.530) (0.397) (0.824) 
Bank dummy 
 
–0.239*** –0.050 
 
(0.004) (0.344) 
Constant 9.115*** 8.860*** 8.704*** 8.626*** 8.626*** 9.233*** 9.004*** 9.033*** 8.929*** 9.332*** 8.916*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No of firms 255 255 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
No of dividend cuts 88 88 58 58 58 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Ancillary/Gamma 0.071 0.081 0.039 0.047 0.047 0.052 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.056 0.058 
Log (pseudo-)likelihood 107.12 77.78 51.14 50.63 50.63 90.18 74.69 83.02 76.21 89.20 76.78 
Wald test (all covariates) 9.37*** 12.43*** 9.62*** 2.77 2.81 28.80*** 21.12*** 14.70** 13.18** 25.96*** 26.29*** 
Wald test (financial ratios) . . 9.62*** 2.77 2.81 7.14*** 5.95** 14.70** 13.09** 18.55*** 16.52*** 
Wald test (imp volatility) 9.37*** 12.43*** . . . 12.89*** 14.13*** 3.66* 4.80** 7.75*** 5.92** 
AIC –208.25 –149.55 –96.27 –89.25 –87.25 –172.36 –141.37 –150.04 –136.43 –160.40 –135.57 
Notes: This table presents the estimation results over the period 2006--2008 from the log-logistic regressions using various sets of time-varying covariates. The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of the survival time, i.e. the duration (measured in days) until the announcement of a dividend cut / suspension or censoring. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. For 
computational reasons, it is worth noting that the results presented in this table are expressed in the accelerated failure-time (AFT) metric, e.g. negative coefficient estimates translate into a 
positive impact on the hazard of “failure”, whereas a positive coefficient estimate implies that a change in the covariate decreases the hazard. P-values are reported in parentheses, below each 
coefficient estimate. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively  
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Table 9: The Cox PH model: in-sample classification accuracy 
Time observed 3 months  6 months 9 months 12 months 15 months 18 months 21 months 
Implied Volatility 
Low IV  98.7% 98.2% 96.3% 93.8% 91.4% 90.2% 88.2% 
High IV 84.2% 77.7% 59.9% 42.2% 29.5% 24.5% 18.0% 
Discriminatory power 14.5% 20.4% 36.4% 51.6% 61.9% 65.7% 70.1% 
Composite score 
Low score  98.7% 98.7% 96.4% 91.0% 86.1% 82.9% 76.8% 
High score 93.7% 93.7% 83.3% 62.8% 48.1% 39.7% 27.3% 
Discriminatory power 5.0% 5.0% 13.0% 28.2% 38.1% 43.1% 49.5% 
IV & score 
Low IV & score 98.4% 98.4% 96.6% 92.5% 89.3% 87.7% 85.2% 
High IV & score 85.8% 85.8% 72.2% 48.3% 34.7% 29.2% 22.2% 
Discriminatory power 12.6% 12.6% 24.4% 44.3% 54.6% 58.5% 63.0% 
Note: This table presents the covariate-adjusted survivor functions based on three distinct Cox PH models 
estimated over the 2006--2008 period: (1) a model including the IV market-based indicator; (2) a model 
including the composite score variable; (3) a model including both the IV indicator and composite score. All 
estimated hazard ratios in the three models are significant at the 5% level. The log rank tests for the equality of 
survivor functions indicate significance at the 1% level.  
 
